万晓西：黄金当立——略论全球货币泡沫(上)
黄金当立!——略论全球货币泡沫(上)
万晓西
金银天然不是货币，货币天然是金银。――马克思
现在全球货币体系的核心问题不是《货币战争》中所论述的美元泡沫或美国的债务悬河，而是1971年以来，“纯粹信用”的美元本位制下的全球货币泡沫。
――题记
★ 按10年和30年周期计算2009年8月、2010年1月前后是非常重要的时间窗口，也就是说黄金走势可能反转。从涨幅来讲，1970年代8年上涨6倍，因此如果也上涨6倍，2008年黄金价格有望达到1500美元。如果按照每年上涨81.5点计算，2009年黄金价格有望看到3000美元。但是并不能排除黄金价格在1000美元左右嘎然而止的可能性。
近代货币博弈史《货币战争》自问世以来，顷刻间风靡长城内外，凤凰卫视《世纪大讲堂》连续四周播放《货币与帝国》系列讲座，英国《金融时》则连发四篇相关评论，并成为中央党校省部级干部培训教材。于是论者各领风骚，或“阴谋论”一笑置之，或“误读”历史“子虚乌有”，或戏说水煮寻章摘句，或蓦然回首慷慨而歌。历史难道都是当代史吗？
世上阳谋行大道，横看成岭侧成峰。防微杜渐千山绿，逝者如斯万水东。子虚乌有浪淘尽，交子宝钞转头空1。金银不言笑沧海，五谷堆里哭西风。
笔者以为《货币战争》基于近代300年世界金融史提出的 “黄金一阳指”为金玉之言，而众多评论似乎有意无意予以忽视。寰球同此凉热，上至人民币战略定位之抉择，下至百姓居家理财之道，黄金王者归来还是一去不返，全球货币体系何去何从，意义极为重大。些许思索，仅供参考。
一、 梦魇般的全球货币泡沫－GDP成为不兑现纸币的殖民地
债券和定期存款有本质区别吗？都是固定支付利息的债务凭证，股票难道不也是一种无固定利息的价格不断波动的债券吗？存款是货币，债券和股票也都是货币。假如没有直接融资，那么需要发行股票和债券和公司，势必寻求贷款，众所周知贷款创造货币，同理没有法定准备金的约束，股票和债券将更加毫无节制的创造货币，每一个涨停板就意味着10％的货币无中生有。流动性过剩的一个根源就是股市房市非理性繁荣的主动货币创造。
那么全球现在共有多少货币呢？IMF《全球金融稳定告》2007年10月2披露2006年末全球货币总量（银行资产＋债券＋股票）3约为190万亿美元，是全球GDP48.2万亿美元的3.95倍，也就是说1美元的GDP对应4美元的货币。如果再考虑到2007年6月名义本金余额高达613万亿4美元的衍生金融市场以及半货币化的房地产市场，全球货币总量约为GDP的16倍。
其次，从交易量来讲，BIS最新调查数据显示2007年4月全球外汇日均交易量为3.21万亿美元（比1973年150亿美元增长213倍），衍生品交易量为10.37万亿美元5，二者合计折合全年交易量为3259万亿美元，相当于2006年全球GDP的67倍。也就是说，1.5％的利差就会导致一年全球GDP换了主人，而这仅仅是考虑外汇交易，还有股票房地产市场交易，这也是发达国家强烈要求发展中国家开放金融市场的根本原因。此外,假定外汇交易成本为万分之五,那么一年全球外汇交易成本就高达1.6万亿美元，占全球GDP的3.4%，也就说如果全球统一货币或实行固定汇率制，全球GDP增长率将提高近一倍，降低交易成本是欧元区成立并扩张的一个主要动力。主要是发展中国家承担全球外汇交易成本和额外风险是发达国家和一些国际组织鼓吹浮动汇率制度的一个重要原因。
第三，供求定律“失效”，“投机定价”逐步主导国际初级产品定价，并不断延伸扩展到实体经济的各个领域。近年以来，对冲基金为代表的金融机构在大宗商品市场呼风唤雨，表明货币传统意义上首要的交易媒介功能已经退居其次，“为买而卖”转为“为卖而买”。货币异化为资本，商品异化为工具，投资异化为投机。也许资本主义的本质就是将一切转化为资本。
第四,英国剑桥博士王小强专著《投机赌博新经济》6，利用统计数据阐明金融市场成为赌场，社会生产对资金需求的信号已完全被赌博过程掩盖；赌博心理将使市场机制中宏观调节和微观调节的看不见的手失效，市场经济将不再存在着均衡。
总之，无论4倍还是16倍，不兑现的货币已经从交易媒介异化为财富和价值转移的工具，也就是说我们是生活在梦魇般的全球货币泡沫之中，GDP已经成为不兑现纸币的殖民地，美元则成为日不落货币泡沫帝国之王。中国民众这两年则切实体会到，老实辛苦工作挣工资远远不如炒股票、炒房子。假如所有人都以投资理财为谋生手段,共产主义就会到来,只要价格持续上涨,只要我们不吃不喝。财产收入为主，工薪收入为辅；资本为王，劳动为奴，也许这是大势所趋？
所以美国新经济不过是赌搏新经济；所以《货币战争》风靡中国；所以货币金融调控为主，中国1993年宏观调控迅速见效，并得以在随后的1997亚洲金融危机立于不败之地7。只有卖地亏本，才能真正有效保护耕地，否则地价飞涨，保护耕地只是数字游戏，稳定粮价也是空中楼阁。
二、 全球货币泡沫必将崩溃
4倍于GDP的全球货币泡沫能够长存吗？纵观历史，两个伟大的日不落帝国8西班牙和大英帝国不过一个世纪便黯然离去，历史加速度表明从1945年建立的美元帝国也许早已经到了寿终正寝回光反照之时。
其实从严格意义来讲，1971年8月15日美国尼克松总统背信弃义关闭黄金兑换窗口已经表明美元黄金帝国的第一次崩溃。其后幸运的不兑现美元恰巧相继碰到1979-1980拉美金融危机、1982年发展中国家债务危机、1990－92年日本泡沫破裂、1992－93年欧洲汇率机制（ERM）危机，1994－1995年墨西哥金融危机、1997－1998亚洲金融危机和俄国金融危机9、1999年巴西金融危机、也许这一切真的都与美元无关，但是这些危机一个相同的客观结果是美元受益，于是不兑现的美元日益风光。不过最近美国人约翰·珀金斯所著《一个经济杀手的自白》10一书中却以自身经历揭露美国经济杀手如何腐蚀他国政治和经济精英，蓄意提出错误的宏观经济分析和产业投资建议，从而最终控制这些国家的经济命脉和自然资源。
但是2000年之后的2000－02年全球互联网泡沫破灭、2007年美国次贷危机都源自美国，也许全球货币泡沫已经大到只有反噬自身才得以维持？1998年长期资本公司的倒闭我们可以归咎为经济学家的数学公式有个小问题，互联网泡沫的破裂我们应该承认成熟股市也会疯狂，但是愈演愈烈的美国次贷危机表明一向标榜为全球楷模的西方金融体系存在严重体制缺限。
宋天水指出美国次贷危机“暴露了欧美金融体系的深层缺陷，在营运、监管、中介各环节的机构、体制及运作模上都出了严重问题，西方一贯所宣扬的金融诚信、法治、央行独立，严格风险管理及回避道德危机等原则，均被抛诸脑后。正如有西方评论者所说，风暴已给英美的金融资本主义模式带来重大打击，今后将要加以重大修改。其高不可仰的先进、高效等神圣形象已破坏无遗”11。 而所涉及的金融市场、产品及机构之广，和资金及资产规模之大（以万亿美元计），均是前所未有者，故所带来的冲击及损失都将比以前的调整大得多。
上帝让人灭亡，必先使其疯狂。现在全球货币体系的核心问题不是《货币战争》中所论述的美元泡沫或美国的债务悬河，而是1971年以来，“纯粹信用”的美元本位制下的全球货币泡沫。虚拟的货币泡沫需要不断汲取实体经济的鲜血，于是20世纪80年代以来，一个又一个货币倒下了，于是一个又一个国家的实体经济千疮百孔。因此，在全球货币泡沫的基本现实下，每一种货币都有可能瞬间倒下，虽然当前全球金融市场对于美元的信心的确已经降到历史低点，但是并不意味着下一个倒下的就是美元，但是美元终将倒下。
如果一夜之间，美元突然发现日元应该大幅度升值50%，则倒下的可能就是日元。但是，种种迹象表明人民币是全球货币泡沫中的最弱一环，如果美元成功度过次贷危机，则以人民币为代表第三世界（新兴市场）货币泡沫的崩溃可能性较高，或者说人民币泡沫崩溃是美元延续其统治地位的一个必要条件。进攻是最好的防守，美元三十余年来深谙此道。
三、 没有货币史，只有货币贬值史
鲁迅先生《狂人日记》中写道：“凡事总须研究，才会明白。古来时常吃人，我也还记得，可是不甚清楚。我翻开历史一查，这历史没有年代，歪歪斜斜的每页上都写着“仁义道德”几个字。我横竖睡不着，仔细看了半夜，才从字缝里看出字来，满本都写着两个字是“吃人”！。”同样认真翻阅货币史，涌入眼帘只有两个字――“贬值”。
伟大的古罗马帝国，2世纪末叶1斤黄金值1125德尼安（denier，denarius，便士），100年之后就能换取德尼安，德尼安贬值到如此幅度，以至于变成了辅币12。公元301年，1金奥莱玉斯（gold aureus）值833 1/3德尼安，到324年，就值4350德尼安13，23年贬值5倍（80％）。文明古国埃及，1金索利都斯(solidus)在公元310年左右可以换取4000埃及德拉克马（drechme, drachma），公元340年左右价值600万德拉克马，400年左右则可换取1.8亿德拉克马，90年贬值4.5万倍（99.9978%）14。
公元189年，董卓进京，毁五铢钱，更铸小钱，“肉好无轮廓，不磨鑢。于是货轻而物贵，谷一斛至数十万，自是后钱贷不行”（《三国志》卷6《魏书·董卓传》）。董卓铸恶质钱引起物价飞涨，是对人民的一种掠夺。唐玄宗开元盛世后，乾元元年（758年）后唐肃宗实行通货贬值政策，铸造大钱，其“重轮乾元重宝”，重11.94克，重量为开元钱的三倍，却当开元钱五十。大钱发行后“谷价腾贵，米斗至七千，饿死者相枕于道”（《旧唐书》卷48《食货志》）南宋纸币会子，由于发行额扶摇直上，乾道四年（1168年）一贯合铜钱770文，咸淳三、四年（1267～1268年）为75 文，已跌到不足1／10。在此情况下，“市井视之，粪土不如，朝廷宝货，自轻太甚”（《可斋续稿》（后）卷三《救蜀褚密奏》）到后来，一贯会子已不值一文钱。嘉熙三年（1259年）李韶概括说：“楮券日轻，民生流离，物价踊贵，遂至事无可为”（《宋史》同上，卷423《李韶传》）。南宋政府到了崩溃的边缘。15
1948年12月1日起发行的人民币在建国初期由于巨额财政赤字也经历了严重的货币贬值。中国社会主义经济建设的开创者和奠基人、新中国经济之父陈云同志1950年2月1日指出人民币自发行以来，到目前为止共发行4.1万亿元，依当时物价计算总值214亿斤小米，因为贬值，现在只值49亿斤小米，即是说通货贬值中，人民损失了165亿斤小米，为时只有一年即损失这么多，是一个极大的数字。这是人民生活水平降低一个具体材料。这样下去，人民将很难维持16。由于严重通货膨胀，每一百元人民币合抗战前法币币值尚不及四厘17，1955年3月1日旧人民币按1万比1折为目前使用的新人民币18。1978年以来人民币实际购买力水平下降速度明显加快，加剧了贫富两极分化，成为构建和谐社会主要障碍之一。2003年以来，房价飙升表明人民币购买力开始新一轮加速贬值。房价暴涨必然迟早导致粮价暴涨，土地不能同时生产高价房和低价粮。
至于近现代各国货币的恶性贬值，例如国民党的法币和金圆券、一战后德国马克以及前苏联卢布等，资料繁多，笔者无需赘言。北京大学卢峰教授研究表明1913年至2000年，中国物价水平约上涨三千亿亿倍（3×1019）19。英国货币史专家约翰·乔恩指出“到20世纪，不可自由兑现的货币已经变得很普遍了。但是却发生几十次、甚至上百次货币体系完全崩溃的事件，而且没有国家能够摆脱通货膨胀的肆虐”20。
总之，纵观整个货币史，古今中外，无论曾经如何辉煌，贬值乃至一文不值仿佛是所有人造货币21的最终宿命，如影随形。总把新桃换旧符，但见新币笑，哪闻旧币哭。唯有金银，流传到永远，所谓“真金白银”。商品货币历经千年风雨，纯粹信用货币只有30余年，不过是货币历史长河中的一朵浪花。可以预见，当以美元为代表的全球信用货币泡沫最终崩溃后，金银铜等商品货币自然浴火重生,如同历史上最早出现的北宋官方纸币交子几经沉沦最终被银两铜钱所取代，退出流通领域。
可叹的是，很多学术精英不相信共产主义，不相信舍生取义，不相信政府，却迷信基于政府信用的纸币,以为天经地义。而西方主流精英却在具有全球影响力的美国《外交》杂志上严肃地讨论国家货币的终结、货币无国界，痛批诺贝尔奖得主蒙代尔成名绝技"最优货币区理论"，明确提出“如果谈论一种基于黄金的新的国际货币体系，肯定听起来很离谱。但1900年时，一个没有黄金的货币体系也是如此。现代科技使得通过私营黄金银行恢复黄金电子货币成为可能，即使没有政府的支持也是如此”。（全文参见附件）
如果信任美联储，信任中央银行，那么就持有信用纸币，否则长期而言持有部分大自然印刷的商品货币是稳妥之举。
四、 个人黄金投机之风险
在全球货币泡沫之下，在高达8个百分点的人民币负利率（CPI减活期存款利率）泡沫之下，正如王小强博士《投机赌博新经济》论述“世界变成了一个大赌场”，没有投资，只有投机；不投机也是一种投机，赌的是资产价格不会向对自己不利的方向变动。即使我们投资大自然印刷的货币――黄金、白银，也是一种投机，投机风险无处不在，小心驶得万年船。
（一） 技术进步
持有任何一种商品，最大的风险来自于技术进步。从短期而言，技术进步将大幅降低生产成本，长期而言则淘汰商品。金戈铁马入梦来，金银不言笑沧海。对于投机黄金，最大的风险也是技术进步。根据英国贵金属咨询机构GFMS的统计，到2006年底人类已开采黄金存量15.8万吨，其中有52%是黄金饰品，18%是以标准金锭的形式由各国央行作为黄金储备，有12%的工业用金，16%的实物黄金投资用金，以及2%的损耗和未计入部分22。海洋学家曾将海水中的含金量作过分析，每吨含有0．004～0．02毫克，全世界海洋中含金的总量至少有1000万吨，乐观地估计，可达5500万吨。我国的渤海、黄海、东海、南海各海域的黄金储量约达吨据。但由于开采技术和开发费用高昂，目前从海水中提炼黄金的想法尚未付诸实施，只得望洋兴叹！科学家还利用特殊的卫星装置探测巨蟹星座中的巨蟹K星为“黄金星”，含金量估计达1000亿吨以上，距地球175光年23。日本科学家松本高明等利用物质的核种变换技术重1.34吨的水银，经过50e6电子伏的γ-射线照射70天后，再经过六年时间的冷却，得到74公斤的黄金，用于这种方法得到的黄金每克成本在20万日元24，折合1盎司黄金约6万美元。
因此，只要黄金价格上涨到一定程度，黄金的供应必然大幅度增加，如同石油价格上升到一定程度，生物能源自然应运而生，投机黄金必须时刻关注黄金开采技术的最新进展。粗略估算，黄金价格在6000美元／盎司或1500人民币元／克以下，从技术进步看目前风险是较小的。
（二） 政治风险
1933年4月5日，罗斯福总统下令美国公民必须上缴他们所有的黄金，任何私藏黄金的人，将被重判10年监禁和25万美元的罚款，该项法令直到1974年才被废除。1948年8月19日，国民党政府颁布《财政经济紧急处分令》，规定黄金、白银、外币禁止流通买卖或持有，必须兑换为金圆券，而从1948年8月到1949年5月不到10个月，上海物价上涨了6400万倍25。因此，投机黄金的政治风险不可忽视，当遭遇严重经济危机或恶性通胀时，政府往往禁止居民拥有金银。实物黄金可以部分规避政治风险，但是实物黄金有存储成本和风险，且目前国内流动性较差，投资比例一般不宜超过10％。
（三） 美元升值
黄金是国际定价，与美元是此消彼涨。从2002年以来，美元经历了3个不同阶段的贬值：第一次是2002-2004年，美元指数下跌15%左右；第二次 2006-2007年美元指数下跌为20%左右，其中美元兑欧元汇率是从1.36美元走低为1.47美元。第三次是2008年以来，截止目前下跌22%左右。但是从基本面并不支持美元如此贬值，因为欧元区的情况可能更糟糕。中国银行全球金融部高级分析师谭雅玲认为“美元是假衰”26。因此如果美元成功度过次贷危机，开始升值，投机黄金风险较大。但是如果人民币出现严重甚至恶性通胀，则降低黄金投机风险。
（四） 供求分析
2006年黄金总开采成本达到401美元/盎司，同比上升18%，其中最大产金国南非为459美元/盎司。因此从天然开采成本来看，2008年南非黄金开采成本估计约为500－600美元，假定物流等交易成本为10－20％，则700美元大体为盈亏平衡点。也就是说按1000美元／盎司购买的黄金可能会出现20－30％的浮动亏损。此外从2005年以来，各国央行黄金出售数量不断下降，而且俄罗斯央行在2005年就开始增加黄金储备27，如果央行成为黄金的净买入方，则黄金价格有望攀升。1996年－2006年央行共净出售黄金5079吨，占总供应的11.5%。
表1：主要产金国历年生产成本变化(单位:美元/盎司)
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
南非
现金成本
304
303
248
236
221
196
179
295
354
363
381
总成本
344
342
273
266
240
214
194
315
395
415
459
澳大利亚
现金成本
292
256
204
207
190
175
187
225
264
282
327
总成本
363
331
264
265
245
226
250
291
326
359
433
美国
现金成本
239
215
185
175
180
189
206
216
250
278
357
总成本
305
287
259
243
245
257
271
276
314
338
430
加拿大
现金成本
227
227
190
192
193
176
182
208
196
258
323
总成本
289
296
261
267
260
235
247
277
274
332
433
其他
现金成本
228
217
190
167
158
153
163
225
198
221
268
总成本
305
293
251
255
221
219
229
279
263
294
348
世界
现金成本
268
250
207
196
187
176
180
224
252
271
317
总成本
327
315
261
257
240
228
233
277
313
339
401
数据：《黄金年鉴2007》
表2：1996-2006年世界黄金供应(单位：吨)
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
矿产金
2375
2527
2574
2602
2618
2645
2612
2620
2492
2550
2471
官方售金
279
326
363
477
479
520
547
617
469
674
328
再生金
644
631
1105
615
616
713
841
944
849
886
1108
净生产者对冲
142
504
97
506
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
净投资者减持*
83
229
-
-
323
33
-
-
-
-
-
总供应量
3523
4217
4139
4200
4017
3894
4000
4181
3844
4111
3906
数据：《黄金年鉴2007》
（五） 图表技术分析
黄金月线图显示1050美元为黄金近期主要的阻力位，MACD指标显示黄金已经极度超买，因此短期振荡可能性较高。1979年到2007年黄金实际上构筑了一个长达28年的的不规则椭圆底，黄金价格突破850美元意义极为重大。1970年日线图显示黄金120日均线目前水平约为860美元，因此850－860美元黄金将具有极强支撑，也是黄金牛熊分界
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28 2008年1月美国官方公布外汇储备为720亿美元，但是其中按每盎司42.22美元计价黄金储备为110亿美元，如按市价900美元，则美国外汇储备为2963亿美元，黄金市值为2353亿美元。
点。
1970年1月30日黄金形成一个重要底部34.94美元，1980年1月12日黄金达到历史高点850美元，10年上涨815点。355个月后1999年8月25日黄金形成本轮周期的重要底部251.95美元，因此按10年和30年周期计算2009年8月、2010年1月前后是非常重要的时间窗口，也就是说黄金走势可能反转。从涨幅来讲，1970年代8年上涨6倍，因此如果也上涨6倍，2008年黄金价格有望达到1500美元。如果按照每年上涨81.5点计算，2009年黄金价格有望看到3000美元。但是并不能排除黄金价格在1000美元左右嘎然而止的可能性。
日线图显示，2005年以来60日均线支撑效果较好，目前60日均线为925美元。但是本次调整也有可能测试120日均线，但是由于是快速深幅调整，如果黄金牛市未结束，则考验可能性较小。黄金2006年以来上涨速度明显加快，是值得警惕的。
图表分析初步表明黄金已经突破重要阻力位，近期虽然有巨幅调整，但是上涨趋势并未得以改变，未来振荡可能性加大，但是目前并不能完全排除1000美元是长期顶部的可能性。此外以上分析只是针对美元，人民币投资黄金尚须考虑人民币汇率走势，人民币长期巨大负利率水平必将导致未来汇率的剧烈波动。
总之，黄金是一种传承历史的令人厌恶的“诚实货币”，但是投机黄金也是有风险的，特别是如果参与更加刺激的黄金期货交易，剧烈波动可能会导致血本无归。美联储3000亿外汇储备80％是黄金28，而中国外汇储备基本都是美元等纸币。个人资产里配置10－30％的金银，可与美联储同进退；都是美元等不兑现的信用纸币，可与中国央行同进退。2007年10月党的17大告明确指出当今世界正处在大变革大调整之中，世界仍然很不安宁，传统安全威胁和非传统安全威胁相互交织，中国的前途命运日益紧密地同世界的前途命运联系在一起。时势造英雄，乱世存黄金，如此而已。
附件：本·斯泰尔 《国家货币的终结》（The End Of National Currency）中英文
（本文仅代表个人观点，与所属机构无关）
2007年10月10日初稿
2008年1月26日二稿
2008年3月26日修订
1 交子系北宋纸币，宝钞系元、明纸币。
2 Global Financial Stability Report: Financial Market Turbulence:Causes, Consequences, and Policies, October 2007, IMF
3 银行资产主要由银行存款组成，故本文用银行资产来粗略估算银行货币。
4 见Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity in 2007 – Final results, BIS，第22页，其中OTC为516.4万亿美元，交易所96.7万亿美元。一般认为衍生产品以实际价值（gross market value, OTC为11万亿美元）计算更为合理，其实衍生的魅力在于杠杆，少量的本金能够撬动、获得几十倍的资产的收益，所以从这一点上讲，以名义本金计算货币总量也是有一定道理的。
5 同上，第4、11页
6 “小强用如下四个环环相扣的命题构成本书论证的逻辑﹕一、根据统计数据，80年代以来股价统计平均已远远超过股息现值，这说明股票交易和真实的生产过程已无关系。而且全球化的金融在现代市场经济中的比重愈来愈大。二、金融市场成为赌场，社会生产对资金需求的信号已完全被赌博过程掩盖。 三、赌博心理将使市场机制中宏观调节和微观调节的看不见的手失效，市场经济将不再存在着均衡。四、一旦保持市场宏观的供求平衡的机制不再存在，自19世纪末到20世纪上半叶社会有效需求不足（供给远大于需求）的状态将再次出现。全球市场经济将再次被历史上发生过的经济危机摧毁（它表现为金融体系崩溃和不可控制的通货收缩）”。见金观涛：经济自由主义的终结？——王小强《投机赌博新经济》代序
《投机赌博新经济》，
简介：改革开放带来物质生产高速增长，金融自由化带来货币经济繁荣娼盛，外资抛空带来金融危机，这首发展中国家现代化的三部曲，成为当代所有「新兴市场」无一例外的宿命。如今，中国是最后一块没有被金融危机洗劫过的处女地。2006年以来的股市证明，大中华完全可以像小日本当年，经历一段买股就赚钱、买楼就升值的疯狂繁荣。有了「追涨」必然「杀跌」。到了普遍担心牛市泡沫不会无止境升腾的时候，豺狼虎豹基金则要抛空卷钱了 ……
7 “1993年时更注重金融手段，16条调控措施中，前11条都与金融有关；其它措施包括加强房地产市场宏观管理、强化税收征管、推进物价改革、严格控制社会集团购买力过快增长等等。2004年的宏观调控非常注重控制土地这一闸门，把土地作为重要调控手段，这可以说是我国独有的；同时，还提出了加强经济运行调节、促进煤电油运和原材料供需衔接，做好食品等生活必需品和生产资料市场的调控与监管，节约资源等调控办法”。刘晓明，《1993和2004年两次宏观调控之比较》，《全球科技经济了望》2005
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8 日不落帝国一词最早是用来形容16世纪时的西班牙帝国的，它于西班牙国王卡洛斯一世（亦即神圣罗马帝国皇帝卡尔五世）的一段论述：“在朕的领土上，太阳永不落下。”在19世纪这一词则被普遍作为大英帝国的别称，特别是在维多利亚时代，那时候英国出版的世界地图把大英帝国用粉红色标出，生动地表现出英国在全球范围内的霸权。
9 参见一场不为人知的金融战争：苏联·俄罗斯金融战役
10《一个经济杀手的自白》，约翰•珀金斯著，杨文策译，广东经济出版社2006年12月第1版。
内容提要:这是一本约翰·珀金斯花了二十多年写成的自白书；这是一本约翰·珀金斯遭到生命威胁和贿赂利诱下仍旧坚持完成的自白书；这是一本媲美《华氏911》电影，并让美国政界、商界、金融界震惊的自白书；
这是一本让美国主流媒体刻意回避和保持沉默但仍旧可以达到空前畅销的自白书。
约翰·珀金斯在书中揭露，经济杀手披着经济学家、银行家、国际金融顾问之类的合法外衣，其实却肩负着建立美国全球霸权的战略任务。
他们通过伪造财政告、操纵选举、贿赂、敲诈、色诱乃至谋杀等手段，拉拢、腐蚀和控制他国的政治与经济精英，向他们蓄意提出错误的宏观经济分析和产业投资建议，诱骗发展中国家落入预设的经济陷阱，从而控制这些国家的经济命脉和自然资源，并通过欺骗手段让成千亿的美金源源不断地流入美国，为巩固、扩大美国在全球的经济、政治和军事霸权服务。
珀金斯在书中披露了自己作为经济杀手期间所见证的一切，并且揭开了最近几起国际重大事件背后的秘密。例如沙特阿拉伯洗钱风波、伊朗国王的垮台、厄瓜多尔和巴拿马总统之死以及美国入侵巴拿马和伊拉克。
11 宋天水：《:世界面临三大变局》，《大公》2008年1月17日
12 [法]让•利瓦尔，任婉筠、任弛译，《货币史》，商务印书馆2001年5月第1版，第18页
13 Due to runaway inflation caused by the government issuing base-metal coinage but refusing to accept anything other than silver or gold for tax payments, the value of the gold aureus in relation to denarii grew drastically. Inflation was also affected by the systematic debasement of the silver denarius which by the mid-third century had practically no silver left in it.In 301 CE one gold aureus was worth 833 1/3 denarii, by 324 CE the same aureus was worth 4,350 denarii. In 337 CE, after Constantine converted to the solidus, one solidus was worth 275,000 denarii and finally by 356 CE one solidus was worth 4,600,000 denarii. “Aureus”，From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
14 同1，第19－20页
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15 钟义盛，《中国历史上的通货膨胀》，《社会科学》1998年第3期；参见汪圣铎，《两宋货币史》下册，社会文献出版社2003年9月第1版，第693-701页。
16 陈云，《陈云文选》第二卷，人民出版社1995年5月第2版，第57页
18 《国务院关于发行新的人民币和收回现行的人民币的命令》，1955年2月21日
19 卢峰 彭凯翔，《我国长期米价研究（1644-2000）》，《经济学(季刊)》第四卷第2期，2005年1月
20 ［英］约翰•F•乔恩著，李广乾译，《货币史－从公元800年起》，商务印书馆2002年9月第1版，第328页
21 货币可以分为天然货币和人造货币，人造货币包括金属铸币（如金币、五铢钱）和信用货币（如纸币）。金属本位制下的通货膨胀主要是政府降低铸币含金量所致，纸币则是过量发行货币。金属本位制下，由于受到“货币锚”的约束，通胀率一般大大低于没有约束的不兑现货币本位制。
版权所有，未经书面许可，不得以任何形式翻印、复制、刊登、发表或引用全部或部分内容。
22 徐以升，《(黄金：能否成为对抗货币信用风险的终极资产？》，《第一财经日》，2008年3月17日
23 《科学家的“黄金梦”》，引自《采矿发展史资料》，
24
25 洪葭管主编，《中国金融史》，1993年7月第1版，第385－389页
26 谭雅玲，《美国设套，人民币升值年内止步》，《数字商业时代》，2008年3月21日
27 俄罗斯央行计划提高黄金储备,
【本刊讯】5月9日出版的美国《外交》双月刊刊登了美国外交关系委员会国际经济部主任本·斯泰尔撰写的一篇文章，题为《国家货币的终结》，摘要如下：
国家货币的终结
The End Of National Currency
本·斯泰尔
2007年8月2日（上本网时间）
货币国家主义的崛起
资本的流动已经成为全球化唯一致命的弱点。25年来，毁灭性的货币危机袭击了拉美和亚洲的各个国家，以及西欧的邻近国家，尤其是俄罗斯和土耳其。就连美国联邦储备委员会理事米什金这样一位支持全球化的、资历无可挑剔的经济学家也承认：“向外国资本流动开放金融体系导致了造成巨大痛苦、苦难乃至暴力的一些灾难性的金融危机。”
经济学这个专业一直未能提供应付货币危机的前后一致的和令人信服的对策。国际货币基金组织的分析人员20年来一直支持采取范围广泛的各种国家汇率和货币政策制度。但是后来，这些制度却遭到了崩溃和失败。他们指出了一个个罪魁祸首，从缺乏严谨的财政政策和对银行的管制不善到糟糕的产业政策和官员的腐败都有。根据有关金融危机的文献提出的政策建议瞻前顾后，而且遭到了普遍的批驳，因而实际上毫无用处。
反对全球化的经济学家们赦免了各国政府的罪责（华盛顿的政府除外），而是把爆发危机的罪责推给市场及其制度支持者，譬如国际货币基金组织——用诺贝尔奖获得者约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨的话说，就是“国际金融的独裁机构”——从而使这个问题颠倒过来。斯蒂格利茨写道：“各国实际上被告知，如果它们不遵守某些条件，资本市场或者国际货币基金组织就会拒绝向它们提供贷款。它们基本上被迫放弃了自己的部分主权。”
这对吗？市场是否失灵？使各国政府恢复丧失的主权是否会制止金融动荡？这是一种危险的误诊。实际上，只有在各国开始要求获得货币方面的“主权”——使之与黄金或者被看作真实财富的任何别的东西相分离——之后，资本的流动才开始破坏稳定。此外，即使全球化的进军并非不可避免，由于世界经济和国际金融体系的演变方式，也不再有超出其范围的经济发展的一种可行的模式。
正确的方针不是回到享有货币主权的神话般的过去，使政府控制本国的利率和汇率，享受着对世界其余地方的无知的快乐。各国政府必须放弃一种致命的观念，就是认为国家特征要求它们制造和控制在本国领土上使用的货币。简单地讲，国家的货币和全球市场是不能相互混杂的，如果混合在一起，就形成货币危机和地缘政治紧张关系的致命混杂，为具有破坏性的保护主义创造现成的借口。为了安全地实现全球化，各国应当放弃货币国家主义，废除不必要的货币，因为它们是今天的许多动荡的根源。
黄金时代
在上一个“全球化”伟大时期之中，就是从19世纪末到第一次世界大战爆发，资本的流量是巨大的，即使按照当代的标准衡量也是如此。这一时期发生了货币危机，但一般并不严重，而且很短暂。这是因为当时的货币——就像在全世界大多数国家和绝大部分人类历史上一样——是黄金，或者起码是对黄金的一种可信的索取权。资金迅速地流回到陷入危机的国家，因为人们对货币与黄金之间的联系将会恢复笃信不疑。与此同时，货币国家主义被认为是落后的迹象，而遵守举世公认的价值标准则是文明的标志。在遵守这一标准方面最值得信赖的国家（譬如澳大利亚、加拿大和美国）所受到的奖赏是最低的国际贷款价格。而遵守情况最差的国家（譬如阿根廷、巴西和智利）所受到的惩罚则是最高的贷款价格。
在一战到二战期间，这种联系遭到了致命的破坏。20世纪30年代和40年代的大多数经济学家都认为，资本的流动显然将会由于汇率不再在可靠的情况下得到固定而对稳定起破坏作用。在1937年的一次演讲中，弗里德里希·哈耶克说，在值得信赖的金本位制度下，“短期资本流动总的来说倾向于缓解国际收支暂时的不利状况的初始原因所造成的紧张。然而，如果汇率是可变的，则资本的转移就会倾向于在这一初始原因的相同方向上进行，因而使之得到加强”——就像今天的情况一样。
普遍的看法曾经是，全球化必须有硬通货，就是外国人愿意持有的某种东西。法国经济学家查尔斯·李斯特评论说：“虽然理论家试图说服公众和各国政府，使之相信最低数量的黄金……就足以维持人们对货币的信心，而且无论如何，纸币，甚至不兑现纸币也可以满足一切需要，但是所有国家的公众都在忙着囤积据说可以兑换成黄金的大量国家货币。”持这一观点的并非局限于自由市场派人士。金本位和全球资本主义的著名批评者卡尔·波拉尼认为，货币国家主义显然与全球化水火不相容。在重点论述英国19世纪在扩大世界贸易方面的兴趣的时候，他争论说：“只有商品货币能够服务于这一目的，其明显的原因是，符号货币，不论是银行票据还是不兑现纸币，都不能在外国领土上流通。”但波拉尼认为是无稽之谈的事情——以毫无内在价值的国家纸币（或“不兑现”纸币）为中介的、货物、劳务和资本方面的全球贸易——就是全球化今天像以往一样断断续续地推进的方式。
把货币的创造和控制与国家主权联系起来的政治神话在著名的“最优货币区”理论的蜕变中，找到了其在经济上的对应物。该理论是获得诺贝尔奖的经济学家罗伯特· 蒙代尔开创的。他长期以来一直是减少国家货币数量主张的一位多产的倡导者。这项理论在以后几十年里成为货币国家主义的一项准科学的基础。
像20世纪60年代初的大多数宏观经济学家一样，蒙代尔持有一种现已基本上丧失信誉的战后凯恩斯主义思维定式，他所笃信不疑的是，决策者在面临经济学家所说的对供求的“冲击”的情况下微调国民需求的能力。他的开创性文章《最优货币区理论》中提出的问题是：“货币区的适当范畴是什么？”他评论说：“乍一看来，这个问题也许是单纯学术性的，因为国家货币是否有朝一日会被放弃，让位于任何其它的安排，这一点看来并不属于政治可行性的范畴。”
蒙代尔接着主张在世界上的各个地区之间实行弹性汇率，在每个地区实行本地区的多国货币，而不是在国家之间。然而，经济学家们接受了蒙代尔对弹性汇率在解决对不同的“地区或者国家”产生不同影响的经济冲击问题方面的利弊的分析。他们认为，这是把现有的国家当作自然的货币区域来对待的一项理由。因此货币国家主义获得了合理的科学依据。从那时起，许多主流经济学家逐渐认识到，偏离“一个国家一种货币”的主张是错误的，起码在没有事先的政治一体化的情况下是如此。
由于经济学家们确立了货币和国家特征之间的联系（就像中世纪的神学家使亚里士多德和耶稣得到调和一样），所以各国政府采纳了最优货币区理论，作为对货币国家主义的主要的知识辩解。
发展中国家的政府一贯对利率、贷款的到期日，甚至还有信用的受益者实行严格的控制——因为所有这一切都要求切断与世界其余国家的金融和货币联系，并严格控制国际资本流动。其结果是，这种流动的发生主要是为了解决贸易失衡或者为直接投资而融资。而本国的金融体系却仍然薄弱和欠发达。但今天的经济增长越来越多地有赖于做出投资决策。这种决策通过全球金融体系来融资和制订。（通过低成本的日元借贷，以便为在欧洲的投资提供资金，同时在美国的期货交易所针对日元的升值采取对冲措施，这已经不再是异乎寻常的。）因此，这个全球体系的不加限制和高效率的准入，而不是各国政府操纵狭隘的货币政策的能力，对于未来的经济发展来说已经变得至关重要。
但是，由于外国人往往不愿意持有发展中国家的货币，所以这些国家本国的金融体系结果基本上被孤立在全球体系之外。它们的利率往往大大高于国际市场，其贷放活动往往非常短暂——在大多数情况下只有几个月。其结果是，许多发展中国家都依赖美元获得长期信贷。因此，资本的流动变得很危险，不论有多么必要：在发展中国家，一旦货币贬值，本国人和外国人都迫不及待地打量抛售本国货币，因为货币的贬值使得该国更加难以偿还外债——由此产生了今天的国际金融体系危险的不稳定状况。
虽然最优货币区理论并没有解释其中的任何问题，但是从推进全球化的观点看，这些问题却是阻碍发展的严重障碍。发展中国家的货币国家主义与这一过程的本质发生矛盾，因而使今后出现金融问题的可能性增大。
危机中的货币
为什么最近几十年来出现一系列货币危机的问题变得如此严重？只是从1971年，就是尼克松总统正式使美元与黄金脱钩的时候起，在全球四处流动的货币才不再是对任何实物的索取权。全世界的货币现在都是政府魔术般地变出的纯粹的主权表象。这种货币的绝大多数都是没人要的：人们不愿把它们当作财富，就是今后会起码像过去一样具有购买力的东西而持有。各国政府可以要求在与国家的交易中使用本国货币，从而迫使本国公民持有本国货币。但没有受到如此强迫的外国人则会选择不这样做。人们只愿意持有美元（和少量其它货币），作为黄金货币的替代物，在这样一个世界上，把货币与主权挂钩的神话是代价巨大的，有时还是危险的。货币国家主义就是与全球化不相容。即使这只是从20世纪70年代以来才变得明显，情况也一直都是这样。当时，全世界的政府都使本国货币丧失了内在的价值。
但是，作为货币学的逻辑与历史问题有悖常理，对全球化持批评意见的最著名的经济学家斯蒂格利茨热情支持了货币国家主义，作为对货币危机所造成的经济混乱的补救方法。当千百万人，包括本国人和外国人，由于担心即将发生的债务拖欠而抛售本国货币时，斯蒂格利茨的解决办法就是使本国货币与世界脱钩：降低利率、贬值、封锁金融流动，以及拒绝向借款人放贷等。恰恰是这种思维——朝着20世纪30年代的孤立主义的大倒退——乃是影响了现代全球化的危机周期的根源。
强势美元？
对于像美国这样一个多样化的经济大国来说，浮动汇率在经济上相当于一场微不足道的牙痛。它们经常需要填充物——其形式为公司金融对冲和积极的全球供应管理——但却从未动过任何大手术。这有两个原因。其一，进口价格上涨时，美国人从国外购买的许多东西就可能会被国内生产迅速和廉价地取代。出口价格下跌时，他们在国外出售的许多东西就可能会被转移到国内市场。其次，外国人也乐于把美元当作财富持有。
对较小和比较落后的经济体来说，情况就不是这样。它们在增长，往往还有纯粹的生存方面依赖进口，但没有美元就不能为其付款。它们怎么办？就要收回它们据说被国际货币基金组织和国际市场夺走的主权，通过用美元替代没人要的本国货币（就像厄瓜多尔和萨尔瓦多5年前所作的那样），或者用欧元替代（波斯尼亚、科索沃和黑山的做法），从而一劳永逸地结束货币危机。就美元化所带来的好处来说，厄瓜多尔堪称楷模：这个陷入不断的政治动乱的国家却一直是经济稳定的堡垒，经济增长稳定而强劲，通胀率也是拉美最低的。无怪乎其新的左派总统拉斐尔·科雷亚不得不放弃其去美元化运动，以便争取选民的支持。把厄瓜多尔与多米尼加共和国加以对比。后者于2004年遭受了一场毁灭性的货币危机——一场不必要的危机，因为其85%的贸易都是与美国进行的（这个数字相当于美国一般的一个州与美国其它州之间贸易所占的百分比）。
人们经常争论说，只有对小国来说，美元化才是可行的。毫无疑问，国家小有助于使过渡简化。但是就连巴西经济也不到加利福尼亚的一半。美国联邦储备委员会对获取美元的更大需求可以毫无痛苦地（并在有利可图的情况下）做出妥协，而又不会以任何方式牺牲其对美国国内物价稳定所做出的承诺。美国政府如果是开明的话，就会在人们持有更多美元的时候退还它通过造币利差所获得的利润，从而使更多的国家在政治上实际上采用美元更加容易，代价也更小。（为了获得美元，实行美元化的国家把美国国库券等附带利息的资产送给美联储。对于这种资产，美国在其它情况下本来必须支付利息。）2000年的国际货币稳定法案本来会使这种退还成为美国官方的政策，但是这项立法在国会中夭折了，因为克林顿行政当局担心，它看上去会很像一项新的外援计划，因而没有予以支持。
波拉尼断言，由于人们永远也不会接受外国不兑现纸币，所以不兑现纸币永远也不能支持对外贸易。美元就是作为这样一种全球货币出现的。
但是，作为今天的全球货币，美元的特权地位并非天赐。美元最终仅仅是通过信用支持的另外一种货币。而其它国家今后之所以愿意接受它，是为了换取与它过去所买到的东西不相上下的有价值的物品。这样一来，就使美国政府机构承担了巨大的负担，必须证明这种信用的合法性。不幸的是，这些机构未能承担这一负担。不顾后果的美国财政政策正在削弱美元的地位，甚至在美元作为全球货币的作用不断扩大的时候也是如此。
40年前，就在布雷顿森林以美元为基础的金汇兑本位崩溃前几年，法国著名经济学家雅克·吕埃夫写道，这个体系“达到了如此荒诞的程度，以致有推理能力的任何人脑都无法为其辩解。”今天，美元风雨飘摇的地位是类似的。美国能够维持长期的国际收支逆差，而始终不会感觉到其影响。汇到国外的美元立即就会以贷款的形式，就是作为在国外毫无用途的美元回到国内。吕埃夫打比喻解释说：“如果我与我的裁缝达成协议，不管我付给他多少钱，他都当天就当作一笔贷款归还给我，我对从他那里订购更多的西装就不会持任何反对意见。”
由于美国的经常项目逆差达到占GDP6.6%这一巨额数字（为了维持它，每天必须输入大约20亿美元），所以美国处于一种值得庆幸的地位，就是成为中国裁缝的西装买主，而中国裁缝则立即以贷款形式——在美国的情况中一般就是购买美国国库券——退还了买主的付款。出现经常项目逆差在一定程度上是由于受到预算赤字的刺激（后者每增加1美元，就会使前者大约增加20美分到50美分）。由于缺乏改革来限制寿命更长的人口的医疗保健和养老金方面的联邦政府“应得权利”开支，所以在今后10年里，预算赤字将会猛增。因此，美国——实际上还有其中国裁缝——都必须关注吕埃夫所说的一件“荒诞事”的可持续性。由于缺乏财政上的长期审慎，美国冒着削弱外国人对其管理美元的方式所给予的信任——就是相信美国政府能够继续维持低通胀率，而又不必诉诸压垮经济增长的利率大幅度提高，以此作为确保资本大量流入的途径——的风险。
货币私营化
普遍的假设是，作为全球货币，美元的天然替代物是欧元。然而，人们对欧元的持久性的信心仍是脆弱的——袭击了美元的财政上的担忧也削弱了这种信心，但也有一种额外的不安，因为人们对意大利等国所面临的恢复货币国家主义的诱惑感到担忧。但还有一项替代选择，乃是世界上货币的最持久形式：黄金。
必须强调的是，管理得当的不兑现纸币体系与基于商品的纸币相比，具有相当大的优势，尤其是它不浪费宝贵的资源。如果从南非挖掘黄金，却在美国诺克斯堡将其重新埋掉，就没有什么可以褒奖之处。问题是在美国，这样一个管理得当的不兑现纸币体系能够维持多久。国家货币可以追溯到2500多年以前的历史记录基本上是糟糕的。
19世纪和20世纪交替之际——金本位的高潮时期——西梅尔评论说：“虽然在理想的社会秩序中，毫无内在价值的货币会是交换的最佳手段，但在达到这一点之前，最令人满意的货币形式则可能是与一种实物相联系的。”今天，由于货币不再与任何实物相联系，所以值得一问的是，世界是否哪怕是接近这种“理想的社会秩序”，就是可以维持一种不兑现美元，作为全球金融体系的基础。如果拥有1万亿美元以上的外汇储备的中国和持有大量美元的另外一些国家担心自己所持有货币令人无法忍受的无足轻重，那么就没有办法可以有效地防范全球失衡的出现。
那么黄金如何呢？恢复金本位根本谈不上。19世纪时，各国政府在一年中花费的国民收入还不到10%。今天，它们经常花掉一半或者更多。因此，它们永远也不会使开支服从于维持一个基于商品的货币体系的严格要求。但私营的黄金银行已经存在，从而使账户的持有者可以用真实的金条作为股份的形式，进行国际支付。虽然黄金银行业目前显然是小本生意，但随着美元的衰落，它近年来有了显著的增长。如果谈论一种基于黄金的新的国际货币体系，肯定听起来很离谱。但1900年时，一个没有黄金的货币体系也是如此。现代科技使得通过私营黄金银行恢复黄金货币成为可能，即使没有政府的支持也是如此。
通用货币
几百年来，几乎每一项反对全球化的最新重大论点都是针对市场的普遍论点（并逐一被抛弃）。但在拥有150种浮动的国家不兑现纸币的世界上，反对资本流动的论点却根本不同。它很有说服力——以致就连全球化的最坚决的支持者也把资本流动当作一个例外，当作知识领域中要加以隔离的东西——一直到能够开发出防范危机的有效疫苗为止——来对待。但是，认为资本的流动具有内在的破坏稳定性，这一观念在逻辑上和历史上却是谬误。必须重温19世纪基于黄金的全球化的教训。纽约和加州是世界上最大的12个经济体当中的两个。正如它们之间每天的巨额资本流动十分平常，以致甚至于无人注意到一样，共享一种货币，譬如美元或欧元的各国之间的资本流动也甚至没有引起最激烈地反对全球化的积极分子们的丝毫注意。
其货币仍然遭到外国人厌恶的各国将继续对预防危机的政策进行试验，实行资本控制和建立美元储备的武库。很少有哪个国家会重复阿根廷失败的努力，即在没有美元协同动作的情况下采取盯住美元的汇率。如果这些政策再让国际货币基金组织烦恼上几年，会很有益处。
但是，世人可以做得更好。由于全球化进程以外的经济发展不再有可能，所以各国应当用美元或欧元取代本国货币，或者在亚洲的情况中，进行协作，以形成一种在具有相应幅员与经济多样化的地区内流通的新的多国货币。
欧洲人过去常说，作为一个国家，必须拥有国家的航空公司、股票交易所和货币。今天却没有任何欧洲国家因没有这些东西而境况变得更糟。就连坏脾气的意大利也由于伴随着采用欧元而来的较低利率和永远结束了里拉投机而受益匪浅。今后如果实行一种按照与此相同的以很低的和稳定的通胀率为目标的原则加以管理的全亚洲范围的货币，会是最有希望的途径，可以使中国全面实行金融和资本市场自由化，而又不用担心会出现人民币造成破坏的投机（中国经济只有加州和佛罗里达州经济加在一起的大小）。世界上大多数较小和比较贫困的国家如果单方面采用美元或者欧元显然都是上策，因为这样会使它们得以安全和迅速地融入到全球金融市场之中。拉美各国应当实行美元化；东欧各国和土耳其则应实行欧元化。广泛而言，这一处方所遵循的原则是相对的贸易流动，但是也有例外。例如，阿根廷在欧元区的贸易就比与美国之间的贸易要多。但是阿根廷人在理财和储蓄方面却采用美元。
当然，实行美元化的各国必须放弃独立的货币政策，不再把它当作政府宏观经济管理的一项工具。但是，由于货币政策长期而艰难的追求的目标，是使利率降低到与很低和稳定的通胀率相一致的最低的水平，所以对世界上大多数国家来说，以此为依据反对实行美元化的论点都是轻浮的。有多少拉美国家能够把利率降低到低于美国利率的水平呢？拉美平均扣除通胀因素以后的贷款利率为20%左右。因此必须问一问，凭借在自行斟酌的基础上指导本国的名义利率上下浮动的能力，发展中国家的中央银行可望在多大程度上促进本国的经济增长？这就像选择一辆安装着手动传送装置的现代牌汽车，而放弃具有自动传输装置的凌志牌的轿车：前者虽然使驾驶员获得较大的控制权，但却付出了在任何情况下性能都很低劣的代价。
至于美国，它需要长期贯彻美联储前主席沃尔克和格林斯潘的健全的货币政策，恢复长期的财政约束。这是使美国的拥有大量和越来越多的美元债权的外国裁缝保持富裕感和安全感的唯一有把握的途径。使美元成为全球货币的是市场——市场所给予的，市场也能够剥夺。如果裁缝们退缩了，美元失灵了，市场就可能会依靠自己的力量对货币实行私营化。
The End of National Currency
By Benn Steil
From Foreign Affairs, May/June 2007
Summary: Global financial instability has sparked a surge in "monetary nationalism" -- the idea that countries must make and control their own currencies. But globalization and monetary nationalism are a dangerous combination, a cause of financial crises and geopolitical tension. The world needs to abandon unwanted currencies, replacing them with dollars, euros, and multinational currencies as yet unborn.
Benn Steil is Director of International Economics at the Council on Foreign Relations and a co-author of Financial Statecraft.
THE RISE OF MONETARY NATIONALISM
Capital flows have become globalization's Achilles' heel. Over the past 25 years, devastating currency crises have hit countries across Latin America and Asia, as well as countries just beyond the borders of western Europe -- most notably Russia and Turkey. Even such an impeccably credentialed pro-globalization economist as U.S. Federal Reserve Governor Frederic Mishkin has acknowledged that "opening up the financial system to foreign capital flows has led to some disastrous financial crises causing great pain, suffering, and even violence."
The economics profession has failed to offer anything resembling a coherent and compelling response to currency crises. International Monetary Fund (IMF) analysts have, over the past two decades, endorsed a wide variety of national exchange-rate and monetary policy regimes that have subsequently collapsed in failure. They have fingered numerous culprits, from loose fiscal policy and poor bank regulation to bad industrial policy and official corruption. The financial-crisis literature has yielded policy recommendations so exquisitely hedged and widely contradicted as to be practically useless.
Antiglobalization economists have turned the problem on its head by absolving governments (except the one in Washington) and instead blaming crises on markets and their institutional supporters, such as the IMF -- "dictatorships of international finance," in the words of the Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz. "Countries are effectively told that if they don't follow certain conditions, the capital markets or the IMF will refuse to lend them money," writes Stiglitz. "They are basically forced to give up part of their sovereignty."
Is this right Are markets failing, and will restoring lost sovereignty to governments put an end to financial instability This is a dangerous misdiagnosis. In fact, capital flows became destabilizing only after countries began asserting "sovereignty" over money -- detaching it from gold or anything else considered real wealth. Moreover, even if the march of globalization is not inevitable, the world economy and the international financial system have evolved in such a way that there is no longer a viable model for economic development outside of them.
The right course is not to return to a mythical past of monetary sovereignty, with governments controlling local interest and exchange rates in blissful ignorance of the rest of the world. Governments must let go of the fatal notion that nationhood requires them to make and control the money used in their territory. National currencies and global markets simply do not mix; together they make a deadly brew of currency crises and geopolitical tension and create ready pretexts for damaging protectionism. In order to globalize safely, countries should abandon monetary nationalism and abolish unwanted currencies, the source of much of today's instability.
THE GOLDEN AGE
Capital flows were enormous, even by contemporary standards, during the last great period of "globalization," from the late nineteenth century to the outbreak of World War I. Currency crises occurred during this period, but they were generally shallow and short-lived. That is because money was then -- as it has been throughout most of the world and most of human history -- gold, or at least a credible claim on gold. Funds flowed quickly back to crisis countries because of confidence that the gold link would be restored. At the time, monetary nationalism was considered a sign of backwardness, adherence to a universally acknowledged standard of value a mark of civilization. Those nations that adhered most reliably (such as Australia, Canada, and the United States) were rewarded with the lowest international borrowing rates. Those that adhered the least (such as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile) were punished with the highest.
This bond was fatally severed during the period between World War I and World War II. Most economists in the 1930s and 1940s considered it obvious that capital flows would become destabilizing with the end of reliably fixed exchange rates. Friedrich Hayek noted in a 1937 lecture that under a credible gold-standard regime, "short-term capital movements will on the whole tend to relieve the strain set up by the original cause of a temporarily adverse balance of payments. If exchanges, however, are variable, the capital movements will tend to work in the same direction as the original cause and thereby to intensify it" -- as they do today.
The belief that globalization required hard money, something foreigners would willingly hold, was widespread. The French economist Charles Rist observed that "while the theorizers are trying to persuade the public and the various governments that a minimum quantity of gold ... would suffice to maintain monetary confidence, and that anyhow paper currency, even fiat currency, would amply meet all needs, the public in all countries is busily hoarding all the national currencies which are supposed to be convertible into gold." This view was hardly limited to free marketeers. As notable a critic of the gold standard and global capitalism as Karl Polanyi took it as obvious that monetary nationalism was incompatible with globalization. Focusing on the United Kingdom's interest in growing world trade in the nineteenth century, he argued that "nothing else but commodity money could serve this end for the obvious reason that token money, whether bank or fiat, cannot circulate on foreign soil." Yet what Polanyi considered nonsensical -- global trade in goods, services, and capital intermediated by intrinsically worthless national paper (or "fiat") monies -- is exactly how globalization is advancing, ever so fitfully, today.
The political mythology associating the creation and control of money with national sovereignty finds its economic counterpart in the metamorphosis of the famous theory of "optimum currency areas" (OCA). Fathered in 1961 by Robert Mundell, a Nobel Prize-winning economist who has long been a prolific advocate of shrinking the number of national currencies, it became over the subsequent decades a quasi-scientific foundation for monetary nationalism.
Mundell, like most macroeconomists of the early 1960s, had a now largely discredited postwar Keynesian mindset that put great faith in the ability of policymakers to fine-tune national demand in the face of what economists call "shocks" to supply and demand. His seminal article, "A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas," asks the question, "What is the appropriate domain of the currency area" "It might seem at first that the question is purely academic," he observes, "since it hardly appears within the realm of political feasibility that national currencies would ever be abandoned in favor of any other arrangement."
Mundell goes on to argue for flexible exchange rates between regions of the world, each with its own multinational currency, rather than between nations. The economics profession, however, latched on to Mundell's analysis of the merits of flexible exchange rates in dealing with economic shocks affecting different "regions or countries" differently; they saw it as a rationale for treating existing nations as natural currency areas. Monetary nationalism thereby acquired a rational scientific mooring. And from then on, much of the mainstream economics profession came to see deviations from "one nation, one currency" as misguided, at least in the absence of prior political integration.
The link between money and nationhood having been established by economists (much in the way that Aristotle and Jesus were reconciled by medieval scholastics), governments adopted OCA theory as the primary intellectual defense of monetary nationalism. Brazilian central bankers have even defended the country's monetary independence by publicly appealing to OCA theory -- against Mundell himself, who spoke out on the economic damage that sky-high interest rates (the result of maintaining unstable national monies that no one wants to hold) impose on Latin American countries. Indeed, much of Latin America has already experienced "spontaneous dollarization": despite restrictions in many countries, U.S. dollars represent over 50 percent of bank deposits. (In Uruguay, the figure is 90 percent, reflecting the appeal of Uruguay's lack of currency restrictions and its famed bank secrecy.) This increasingly global phenomenon of people rejecting national monies as a store of wealth has no place in OCA theory.
NO TURNING BACK
Just a few decades ago, vital foreign investment in developing countries was driven by two main motivations: to extract raw materials for export and to gain access to local markets heavily protected against competition from imports. Attracting the first kind of investment was simple for countries endowed with the right natural resources. (Companies readily went into war zones to extract oil, for example.) Governments pulled in the second kind of investment by erecting tariff and other barriers to competition so as to compensate foreigners for an otherwise unappealing business climate. Foreign investors brought money and know-how in return for monopolies in the domestic market.
This cozy scenario was undermined by the advent of globalization. Trade liberalization has opened up most developing countries to imports (in return for export access to developed countries), and huge declines in the costs of communication and transport have revolutionized the economics of global production and distribution. Accordingly, the reasons for foreign companies to invest in developing countries have changed. The desire to extract commodities remains, but companies generally no longer need to invest for the sake of gaining access to domestic markets. It is generally not necessary today to produce in a country in order to sell in it (except in large economies such as Brazil and China).
At the same time, globalization has produced a compelling new reason to invest in developing countries: to take advantage of lower production costs by integrating local facilities into global chains of production and distribution. Now that markets are global rather than local, countries compete with others for investment, and the factors defining an attractive investment climate have changed dramatically. Countries can no longer attract investors by protecting them against competition; now, since protection increases the prices of goods that foreign investors need as production inputs, it actually reduces global competitiveness.
In a globalizing economy, monetary stability and access to sophisticated financial services are essential components of an attractive local investment climate. And in this regard, developing countries are especially poorly positioned.
Traditionally, governments in the developing world exercised strict control over interest rates, loan maturities, and even the beneficiaries of credit -- all of which required severing financial and monetary links with the rest of the world and tightly controlling international capital flows. As a result, such flows occurred mainly to settle trade imbalances or fund direct investments, and local financial systems remained weak and underdeveloped. But growth today depends more and more on investment decisions funded and funneled through the global financial system. (Borrowing in low-cost yen to finance investments in Europe while hedging against the yen's rise on a U.S. futures exchange is no longer exotic.) Thus, unrestricted and efficient access to this global system -- rather than the ability of governments to manipulate parochial monetary policies -- has become essential for future economic development.
But because foreigners are often unwilling to hold the currencies of developing countries, those countries' local financial systems end up being largely isolated from the global system. Their interest rates tend to be much higher than those in the international markets and their lending operations extremely short -- not longer than a few months in most cases. As a result, many developing countries are dependent on U.S. dollars for long-term credit. This is what makes capital flows, however necessary, dangerous: in a developing country, both locals and foreigners will sell off the local currency en masse at the earliest whiff of devaluation, since devaluation makes it more difficult for the country to pay its foreign debts -- hence the dangerous instability of today's international financial system.
Although OCA theory accounts for none of these problems, they are grave obstacles to development in the context of advancing globalization. Monetary nationalism in developing countries operates against the grain of the process -- and thus makes future financial problems even more likely.
MONEY IN CRISIS Why has the problem of serial currency crises become so severe in recent decades It is only since 1971, when President Richard Nixon formally untethered the dollar from gold, that monies flowing around the globe have ceased to be claims on anything real. All the world's currencies are now pure manifestations of sovereignty conjured by governments. And the vast majority of such monies are unwanted: people are unwilling to hold them as wealth, something that will buy in the future at least what it did in the past. Governments can force their citizens to hold national money by requiring its use in transactions with the state, but foreigners, who are not thus compelled, will choose not to do so. And in a world in which people will only willingly hold dollars (and a handful of other currencies) in lieu of gold money, the mythology tying money to sovereignty is a costly and sometimes dangerous one. Monetary nationalism is simply incompatible with globalization. It has always been, even if this has only become apparent since the 1970s, when all the world's governments rendered their currencies intrinsically worthless.
Yet, perversely as a matter of both monetary logic and history, the most notable economist critical of globalization, Stiglitz, has argued passionately for monetary nationalism as the remedy for the economic chaos caused by currency crises. When millions of people, locals and foreigners, are selling a national currency for fear of an impending default, the Stiglitz solution is for the issuing government to simply decouple from the world: drop interest rates, devalue, close off financial flows, and stiff the lenders. It is precisely this thinking, a throwback to the isolationism of the 1930s, that is at the root of the cycle of crisis that has infected modern globalization.
Argentina has become the poster child for monetary nationalists -- those who believe that every country should have its own paper currency and not waste resources hoarding gold or hard-currency reserves. Monetary nationalists advocate capital controls to avoid entanglement with foreign creditors. But they cannot stop there. As Hayek emphasized in his 1937 lecture, "exchange control designed to prevent effectively the outflow of capital would really have to involve a complete control of foreign trade," since capital movements are triggered by changes in the terms of credit on exports and imports.
Indeed, this is precisely the path that Argentina has followed since 2002, when the government abandoned its currency board, which tried to fix the peso to the dollar without the dollars necessary to do so. Since writing off $80 billion worth of its debts (75 percent in nominal terms), the Argentine government has been resorting to ever more intrusive means in order to prevent its citizens from protecting what remains of their savings and buying from or selling to foreigners. The country has gone straight back to the statist model of economic control that has failed Latin America repeatedly over generations. The government has steadily piled on more and more onerous capital and domestic price controls, export taxes, export bans, and limits on citizens' access to foreign currency. Annual inflation has nevertheless risen to about 20 percent, prompting the government to make ham-fisted efforts to manipulate the official price data. The economy has become ominously dependent on soybean production, which surged in the wake of price controls and export bans on cattle, taking the country back to the pre-globalization model of reliance on a single commodity export for hard-currency earnings. Despite many years of robust postcrisis economic recovery, GDP is still, in constant U.S. dollars, 26 percent below its peak in 1998, and the country's long-term economic future looks as fragile as ever.
When currency crises hit, countries need dollars to pay off creditors. That is when their governments turn to the IMF, the most demonized institutional face of globalization. The IMF has been attacked by Stiglitz and others for violating "sovereign rights" in imposing conditions in return for loans. Yet the sort of compromises on policy autonomy that sovereign borrowers strike today with the IMF were in the past struck directly with foreign governments. And in the nineteenth century, these compromises cut far more deeply into national autonomy.
Historically, throughout the Balkans and Latin America, sovereign borrowers subjected themselves to considerable foreign control, at times enduring what were considered to be egregious blows to independence. Following its recognition as a state in 1832, Greece spent the rest of the century under varying degrees of foreign creditor control; on the heels of a default on its 1832 obligations, the country had its entire finances placed under French administration. In order to return to the international markets after 1878, the country had to precommit specific revenues from customs and state monopolies to debt repayment. An 1887 loan gave its creditors the power to create a company that would supervise the revenues committed to repayment. After a disastrous war with Turkey over Crete in 1897, Greece was obliged to accept a control commission, comprised entirely of representatives of the major powers, that had absolute power over the sources of revenue necessary to fund its war debt. Greece's experience was mirrored in Bulgaria, Serbia, the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and, of course, Argentina.
There is, in short, no age of monetary sovereignty to return to. Countries have always borrowed, and when offered the choice between paying high interest rates to compensate for default risk (which was typical during the Renaissance) and paying lower interest rates in return for sacrificing some autonomy over their ability to default (which was typical in the nineteenth century), they have commonly chosen the latter. As for the notion that the IMF today possesses some extraordinary power over the exchange-rate policies of borrowing countries, this, too, is historically inaccurate. Adherence to the nineteenth-century gold standard, with the Bank of England at the helm of the system, severely restricted national monetary autonomy, yet governments voluntarily subjected themselves to it precisely because it meant cheaper capital and greater trade opportunities.
THE MIGHTY DOLLAR
For a large, diversified economy like that of the United States, fluctuating exchange rates are the economic equivalent of a minor toothache. They require fillings from time to time -- in the form of corporate financial hedging and active global supply management -- but never any major surgery. There are two reasons for this. First, much of what Americans buy from abroad can, when import prices rise, quickly and cheaply be replaced by domestic production, and much of what they sell abroad can, when export prices fall, be diverted to the domestic market. Second, foreigners are happy to hold U.S. dollars as wealth.
This is not so for smaller and less advanced economies. They depend on imports for growth, and often for sheer survival, yet cannot pay for them without dollars. What can they do Reclaim the sovereignty they have allegedly lost to the IMF and international markets by replacing the unwanted national currency with dollars (as Ecuador and El Salvador did half a decade ago) or euros (as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Montenegro did) and thereby end currency crises for good. Ecuador is the shining example of the benefits of dollarization: a country in constant political turmoil has been a bastion of economic stability, with steady, robust economic growth and the lowest inflation rate in Latin America. No wonder its new leftist president, Rafael Correa, was obliged to ditch his de-dollarization campaign in order to win over the electorate. Contrast Ecuador with the Dominican Republic, which suffered a devastating currency crisis in 2004 -- a needless crisis, as 85 percent of its trade is conducted with the United States (a figure comparable to the percentage of a typical U.S. state's trade with other U.S. states).
It is often argued that dollarization is only feasible for small countries. No doubt, smallness makes for a simpler transition. But even Brazil's economy is less than half the size of California's, and the U.S. Federal Reserve could accommodate the increased demand for dollars painlessly (and profitably) without in any way sacrificing its commitment to U.S. domestic price stability. An enlightened U.S. government would actually make it politically easier and less costly for more countries to adopt the dollar by rebating the seigniorage profits it earns when people hold more dollars. (To get dollars, dollarizing countries give the Federal Reserve interest-bearing assets, such as Treasury bonds, which the United States would otherwise have to pay interest on.) The International Monetary Stability Act of 2000 would have made such rebates official U.S. policy, but the legislation died in Congress, unsupported by a Clinton administration that feared it would look like a new foreign-aid program.
Polanyi was wrong when he claimed that because people would never accept foreign fiat money, fiat money could never support foreign trade. The dollar has emerged as just such a global money. This phenomenon was actually foreseen by the brilliant German philosopher and sociologist Georg Simmel in 1900. He surmised:
"Expanding economic relations eventually produce in the enlarged, and finally international, circle the same features that originally characterized only closed groups; economic and legal conditions overcome the spatial separation more and more, and they come to operate just as reliably, precisely and predictably over a great distance as they did previously in local communities. To the extent that this happens, the pledge, that is the intrinsic value of the money, can be reduced. ... Even though we are still far from having a close and reliable relationship within or between nations, the trend is undoubtedly in that direction."
But the dollar's privileged status as today's global money is not heaven-bestowed. The dollar is ultimately just another money supported only by faith that others will willingly accept it in the future in return for the same sort of valuable things it bought in the past. This puts a great burden on the institutions of the U.S. government to validate that faith. And those institutions, unfortunately, are failing to shoulder that burden. Reckless U.S. fiscal policy is undermining the dollar's position even as the currency's role as a global money is expanding.
Four decades ago, the renowned French economist Jacques Rueff, writing just a few years before the collapse of the Bretton Woods dollar-based gold-exchange standard, argued that the system "attains such a degree of absurdity that no human brain having the power to reason can defend it." The precariousness of the dollar's position today is similar. The United States can run a chronic balance-of-payments deficit and never feel the effects. Dollars sent abroad immediately come home in the form of loans, as dollars are of no use abroad. "If I had an agreement with my tailor that whatever money I pay him he returns to me the very same day as a loan," Rueff explained by way of analogy, "I would have no objection at all to ordering more suits from him."
With the U.S. current account deficit running at an enormous 6.6 percent of GDP (about $2 billion a day must be imported to sustain it), the United States is in the fortunate position of the suit buyer with a Chinese tailor who instantaneously returns his payments in the form of loans -- generally, in the U.S. case, as purchases of U.S. Treasury bonds. The current account deficit is partially fueled by the budget deficit (a dollar more of the latter yields about 20-50 cents more of the former), which will soar in the next decade in the absence of reforms to curtail federal "entitlement" spending on medical care and retirement benefits for a longer-living population. The United States -- and, indeed, its Chinese tailor -- must therefore be concerned with the sustainability of what Rueff called an "absurdity." In the absence of long-term fiscal prudence, the United States risks undermining the faith foreigners have placed in its management of the dollar -- that is, their belief that the U.S. government can continue to sustain low inflation without having to resort to growth-crushing interest-rate hikes as a means of ensuring continued high capital inflows.
PRIVATIZING MONEY
It is widely assumed that the natural alternative to the dollar as a global currency is the euro. Faith in the euro's endurance, however, is still fragile -- undermined by the same fiscal concerns that afflict the dollar but with the added angst stemming from concerns about the temptations faced by Italy and others to return to monetary nationalism. But there is another alternative, the world's most enduring form of money: gold.
It must be stressed that a well-managed fiat money system has considerable advantages over a commodity-based one, not least of which that it does not waste valuable resources. There is little to commend in digging up gold in South Africa just to bury it again in Fort Knox. The question is how long such a well-managed fiat system can endure in the United States. The historical record of national monies, going back over 2,500 years, is by and large awful.
At the turn of the twentieth century -- the height of the gold standard -- Simmel commented, "Although money with no intrinsic value would be the best means of exchange in an ideal social order, until that point is reached the most satisfactory form of money may be that which is bound to a material substance." Today, with money no longer bound to any material substance, it is worth asking whether the world even approximates the "ideal social order" that could sustain a fiat dollar as the foundation of the global financial system. There is no way effectively to insure against the unwinding of global imbalances should China, with over a trillion dollars of reserves, and other countries with dollar-rich central banks come to fear the unbearable lightness of their holdings.
So what about gold A revived gold standard is out of the question. In the nineteenth century, governments spent less than ten percent of national income in a given year. Today, they routinely spend half or more, and so they would never subordinate spending to the stringent requirements of sustaining a commodity-based monetary system. But private gold banks already exist, allowing account holders to make international payments in the form of shares in actual gold bars. Although clearly a niche business at present, gold banking has grown dramatically in recent years, in tandem with the dollar's decline. A new gold-based international monetary system surely sounds far-fetched. But so, in 1900, did a monetary system without gold. Modern technology makes a revival of gold money, through private gold banks, possible even without government support.
COMMON CURRENCIES
Virtually every major argument recently leveled against globalization has been leveled against markets generally (and, in turn, debunked) for hundreds of years. But the argument against capital flows in a world with 150 fluctuating national fiat monies is fundamentally different. It is highly compelling -- so much so that even globalization's staunchest supporters treat capital flows as an exception, a matter to be intellectually quarantined until effective crisis inoculations can be developed. But the notion that capital flows are inherently destabilizing is logically and historically false. The lessons of gold-based globalization in the nineteenth century simply must be relearned. Just as the prodigious daily capital flows between New York and California, two of the world's 12 largest economies, are so uneventful that no one even notices them, capital flows between countries sharing a single currency, such as the dollar or the euro, attract not the slightest attention from even the most passionate antiglobalization activists.
Countries whose currencies remain unwanted by foreigners will continue to experiment with crisis-prevention policies, imposing capital controls and building up war chests of dollar reserves. Few will repeat Argentina's misguided efforts to fix a dollar exchange rate without the dollars to do so. If these policies keep the IMF bored for a few more years, they will be for the good.
But the world can do better. Since economic development outside the process of globalization is no longer possible, countries should abandon monetary nationalism. Governments should replace national currencies with the dollar or the euro or, in the case of Asia, collaborate to produce a new multinational currency over a comparably large and economically diversified area.
Argentina, for example, does more eurozone than U.S. trade, but Argentines think and save in dollars.
Of course, dollarizing countries must give up independent monetary policy as a tool of government macroeconomic management. But since the Holy Grail of monetary policy is to get interest rates down to the lowest level consistent with low and stable inflation, an argument against dollarization on this ground is, for most of the world, frivolous. How many Latin American countries can cut interest rates below those in the United States The average inflation-adjusted lending rate in Latin America is about 20 percent. One must therefore ask what possible boon to the national economy developing-country central banks can hope to achieve from the ability to guide nominal local rates up and down on a discretionary basis. It is like choosing a Hyundai with manual transmission over a Lexus with automatic: the former gives the driver more control but at the cost of inferior performance under any condition.
As for the United States, it needs to perpetuate the sound money policies of former Federal Reserve Chairs Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan and return to long-term fiscal discipline. This is the only sure way to keep the United States' foreign tailors, with their massive and growing holdings of dollar debt, feeling wealthy and secure. It is the market that made the dollar into global money -- and what the market giveth, the market can taketh away. If the tailors balk and the dollar fails, the market may privatize money on its own.
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