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解构英国经济学人文章:愤怒的中国

2025-02-24 观点 评论 阅读
  

  新译文:【08.5.1 英国 经济学人】愤怒的中国 (2008-05-03)

  

  张馨文 翻译

  

   最近,对咆哮的中国的匆匆一瞥,已足够让我们的政府和全世界惊恐万分了。
中国正处于令人惊恐的状态中。成千上万的中国人挥舞的仇外的拳头,显示着这个国家正走在成为超级强权的道路上,这股力量似乎比乐天派们所希望的要危险得多。但是对于外国人来说,应该担忧的并非这些景象,煽动民族主义情绪爆发的中国政府,同样值得忧虑。

  

   近三十年来,甩掉了除执政党名字外的所有共产主义元素的中国政府,已通过经济的发展证明了其垄断性权力的正当性。许多中国人正享受着祖先们难以想象的繁荣。对他们来说,时间还未久远到需要别人提醒他们,他们父辈所经历的严酷艰苦的童年。他们需要新的抱负。

  

   政府的解决办法是向人民承诺,中国将恢复在全球事务中心的正当地位。由是引发了对赢得奥运会的自豪,以及在令人窘迫的火炬传递中的暴怒。但民族主义呼声是一把双刃剑:当有合适的国内事务作为导火线时(如下文所述),政府本身也很容易使其激发出来。

  

  百万兵变

  

   火炬传递激起了形形色色的针对所谓的中国罪恶的抗议:关于西藏的,关于中国人权记录的,关于和某些讨人嫌的政权的亲密关系。而一一上演的这些,已经导致了来自成千上万的中国侨民,来自国内华人和互联网上的反抗议。

  

   中国人的暴怒聚焦于作出所谓的“反华”歪曲的西方媒体,控告其忽视三月份的动荡中藏人实施的暴行。由此开始,中国卫士们进一步指责整个西方自由主义民主政治是个骗局。他们声称,用这种原则来批评中国根本就是一种伪善。他们引用了有关双重标准的进一步证据:为了减少自己的碳排放,西方人把自己的污染工业放到中国,潜在地阻止、剥夺着新进富裕起来的中国人拥有汽车的权力。并且随着美国总统选举战的进行,可以预期,以对“虚弱独裁者”的高贵愤怒为托词的保护主义政策,将伴随着更多的“中国拳”共同出击。

  

   中国人的暴怒程度已超出了所谓的冒犯的程度。这反映出了一种畏惧,一种愤恨,受威胁的西方决心阻止中国的成长。奥运会已变成了中国获得应有尊重的权力的标志,而抗议、批评和抵制,被视为对“接受和适应中国”的广泛排斥的一部分。

  

   毫无疑问,这些冒犯在中国激起的愤怒是真诚的。“这些反响是由政府组织人发出的”的想法纯属幻觉。中国和印度一样,现在正是一片面临着百万兵变的土地。众多农民愤怒于贪婪的地方官耗尽土地大兴土木;到处都有人惊骇于为了可能的发展而对中国的空气、河流、湖泊进行的毒害;勤奋工作的正直民众愤怒于那些迅速致富的腐败官员的轻蔑对待;而执政党仍旧在愚弄法律,嘲笑司法公正。

  

   于是,危险被摆在政府面前。广泛的愤怒一旦被激起,就很容易转移目标。本周末,中国将纪念一场被视为其漫长革命历程中的一次关键事件——1919年5月4日针对“凡尔赛条约之耻”而进行的抗议,该条约将德国在华“特权”转让给了日本。中国共产党正是发端于此运动。无论现在还是当时,任何针对中国尊严遭到冒犯而进行的抗议,都可能转为谴责政府无力维护中国尊严的抗议。

  

  请记住五月十五日

  

  
西方世界的商人和决策者们站到了中国人愤怒的反方向。如同奥运会主办者当年交的学费一样,当西方消费者和股东中的激进分子们要求站出来反对那些已知的中国的弊端时,中国自己的公司合伙人和消费者早已经为转攻为守准备得太充分了。西方决策者们同样面临着困难的平衡者角色,他们需要承认中国的快速、长足进步,并已经给予其民众新的机遇甚至是新的自由,尽管这还远不足以建立民主政治。但这并不是是说他们应该迎合中国的傲慢,西方领导人有责任提高对人权、西藏和其它“敏感”问题的关注。他们不需要用“此举无效”来自我开脱,有观点认为,施压是有作用的:中国已在谨慎地帮助缅甸、朝鲜和苏丹,甚至同意和dl的代表重新开始对话。这些事情的发生是由于国外的批评,而不是敌对。

  

   悲观主义者害怕如果中国面对太多此类压力,统治精英中的强硬派将会取代目前掌握大局的中间派。但即使他们这样做了,仍然很难想象他们能怎样结束已历时30年的开放而闭关自守。这个史无前例的现象,这个拥有最大人口的国家与世界的疾速融合,看来是不可撤销的。我们可以做点什么让事情容易些,比如改革那些反映着六十年前世界秩序的全球制度体系。但世界和中国都需要学习如何彼此适应。

  

   对中国来说,这意味着学习尊重外国人的参与权,甚至是在其“国内事务”方面。对于此类批评,需要更恰当的反应,不仅是在中国的大国雄心上,也应该在其国内稳定上,因为虽然政府可以将人民的不满从国内暂时转移到对外国人的攻击上,但这样的愤怒,一旦被激起,就可能失去控制,到最后,中国的领导者们将不得不对付迎面而来的打击,被困于造成国家危险状态的污染、腐败和人权问题。将来中国人民会要求这些的。

  The recent glimpses of a snarling China should scare the country's government as much as the world

  

  
CHINA is in a frightening mood. The sight of thousands of Chinese people waving xenophobic fists suggests that a country on its way to becoming a superpower may turn out to be a more dangerous force than optimists had hoped. But it isn't just foreigners who should be worried by these scenes: the Chinese government, which has encouraged this outburst of nationalism, should also be afraid.
For three decades, having shed communism in all but the name of its ruling party, China's government has justified its monopolistic hold on power through economic advance. Many Chinese enjoy a prosperity undreamt of by their forefathers. For them, though, it is no longer enough to be reminded of the grim austerity of their parents' childhoods. They need new aspirations.
The government's solution is to promise them that China will be restored to its rightful place at the centre of world affairs. Hence the pride at winning the Olympics, and the fury at the embarrassing protests during the torch relay. But the appeal to nationalism is a double-edged sword: while it provides a useful outlet for domestic discontents (see article), it could easily turn on the government itself.
A million mutinies
The torch relay has galvanised protests about all manner of alleged Chinese crimes: in Tibet, in China's broader human-rights record, in its cosy relations with repellent regimes. And these in turn have drawn counter-protests from thousands of expatriate Chinese, from Chinese within the country and on the internet.
Chinese rage has focused on the alleged “anti-China” bias of the Western press, which is accused of ignoring violence by Tibetans in the unrest in March. From this starting-point China's defenders have gone on to denounce the entire edifice of Western liberal democracy as a sham. Using its tenets to criticise China is, they claim, sheer hypocrisy. They cite further evidence of double standards: having exported its dirtiest industries to China, the West wants the country to curb its carbon emissions, potentially impeding its growth and depriving newly well-off Chinese of their right to a motor car. And as the presidential election campaign in America progresses, more China-bashing can be expected, with protectionism disguised as noble fury at “coddling dictators”.
China's rage is out of all proportion to the alleged offences. It reflects a fear that a resentful, threatened West is determined to thwart China's rise. The Olympics have become a symbol of China's right to the respect it is due. Protests, criticism and boycott threats are seen as part of a broader refusal to accept and accommodate China.
There is no doubt genuine fury in China at these offences; yet the impression the response gives of a people united behind the government is an illusion. China, like India, is a land of a million mutinies now. Legions of farmers are angry that their land has been swallowed up for building by greedy local officials. People everywhere are aghast at the poisoning of China's air, rivers and lakes in the race for growth. Hardworking, honest citizens chafe at corrupt officials who treat them with contempt and get rich quick. And the party still makes an ass of the law and a mockery of justice.
Herein lies the danger for the government. Popular anger, once roused, can easily switch targets. This weekend China will be commemorating an event seen as pivotal in its long revolution—the protests on May 4th 1919 against the humiliation of China by the Versailles treaty (which bequeathed German “concessions” in China to Japan). The Communist Party had roots in that movement. Now, as then, protests at perceived slights against China's dignity could turn against a government accused of not doing enough to safeguard it.
Remember the ides of May
Western businessmen and policymakers are pulled in opposite directions by Chinese anger. As the sponsors of the Olympics have learned to their cost, while consumer- and shareholder-activists in the West demand they take a stand against perceived Chinese abuses, in China itself firms' partners and customers are all too ready to take offence. Western policymakers also face a difficult balancing act. They need to recognise that China has come a long way very quickly, and offers its citizens new opportunities and even new freedoms, though these are still far short of what would constitute democracy. Yet that does not mean they should pander to China's pride. Western leaders have a duty to raise concerns about human rights, Tibet and other “sensitive” subjects. They do not need to resign themselves to ineffectiveness: up to a point, pressure works: China has been modestly helpful over Myanmar, North Korea and Sudan. It has even agreed to reopen talks with the Dalai Lama's representatives. This has happened because of, not despite, criticism from abroad.
Pessimists fear that if China faces too much such pressure, hardliners within the ruling elite will triumph over the “moderates” in charge now. But even if they did, it is hard to see how they could end the 30-year-old process of opening up and turn China in on itself. This unprecedented phenomenon, of the rapid integration into the world of its most populous country, seems irreversible. There are things that could be done to make it easier to manage—including reform of the architecture of the global institutions that reflect a 60-year-old world order. But the world and China have to learn to live with each other.
For China, that means learning to respect foreigners' rights to engage it even on its “internal affairs”. A more measured response to such criticism is necessary not only to China's great-power ambitions, but also to its internal stability; for while the government may distract Chinese people from their domestic discontents by breathing fire at foreigners, such anger, once roused, can run out of control. In the end, China's leaders will have to deal with those frustrations head-on, by tackling the pollution, the corruption and the human-rights abuses that contribute to the country's dangerous mood. The Chinese people will demand it.

  

  【译者评】

  

  I respected Economist, although it is in opposition with my country.
West never realized that Chinese never thought a government is someone others, that’s why you always misunderstood our voice. Only “we” can set up a government, and once the government become “others”, we kick them down. Do you know what did we call a governor in the past We called them Parents. Do you apprehend that

  

  
我尊重《经济学人》这本杂志,尽管它不是和我们的国家一边的。

  

   西方人从未意识到,中国人从不认为政府是“别人”,这就是为什么他们总是误解我们声音的原因。只有“自己人”才能建立政府,而一旦这个政府变质,我们就把它踢下台。知道过去我们怎么称呼地方官吗?“父母官”。你滴外国人滴明白?

  

   如果按照一个外国人的角度,经济学人的这篇文章已经是惊人的客观和深刻了。有时我甚至觉得,有经济学人这样的刊物存在,甚至可以说是对我们的一种威胁。160年前,我们国家惨败于英国时,正是康乾盛世的尾声,不仅财富是对方的六倍,兵力更是几十倍于对方。但我们依然惨败,败得像个笑话。为什么?就是因为我们不了解西方。而现在,似乎中西方的角色互换了。从利益的角度,我宁可不存在经济学人这样的杂志

  

   转移国内目标?也许有吧。但我肯定政府也没预料到这次的反响这么大。外国人第一次看到中国人的愤怒,才会觉得是不是有什么阴谋在后面,他们知不知道,“国外反华势力”这类新闻我们听得耳朵都起茧了,难道这次是因为胡总提前拜对了真佛?

  

   经常地,面对西方人庞大而根深蒂固的愚蠢狂热的宗教情结,总是油然而生一种无力的挫败感,只想骂“烦死人了”!最近又有佛塔现瑞,也许我也应该用化外愚民的口吻,跟那些西方的宗教狂们大叫:“我们的神告诉我们盛世已至!你们叫唤什么也不管用了!”

解构英国经济学人文章:愤怒的中国

黄伊

传播学中有一个概念叫“opinion leader”,也就是说群众在使用媒体和对公众舆论思考方面是受他所相信的有权威地位的人或媒体的引导的.在西方传媒界,对种种现象问题的分析,特别是新出现的重大事件,也是需要有权威地位的媒体发挥舆论引导的作用.英国的经济学人就是西方主流媒介中重要的“舆论引导者”。它最近发表的这篇“愤怒的中国”一文,实际上是有如下几个作用:

1。为中国民众最近的反藏独、反西媒保奥运全球运动定性,将海内外中国人华人的爱国主义运动恶意地定性为“排外的民族主义”;
2。狡猾地离间中国政府和中国民众,既暗示中国人民的爱国热情其实是对国内无数问题不满的曲线爆发,又希望中国政府可以施手段限制民众的情绪,因为会引火烧身;
3。给西方政客和资本家为继续抹黑中国干涉中国内政打气;
4。对国内自由主义精英进行鼓励和指点

文章集中体现了西方传媒,特别是面向西方商业和知识界精英的英国老牌媒体的一惯阴损狡猾话里有话春秋笔法的特征。现逐字逐段进行分析结构。正所谓奇文共欣赏,移义相与析。

在标题里的三个关键词
Angry, snarling, scare
愤怒,咆哮嚎叫,恐吓

在一个十几个字的题目中,就已经有了三个如此刻意描绘中国人爱国运动的词汇,的用心倾向了已经一目了然。
Angry China: The recent glimpses of a snarling China should scare the country’s (The Economist)
May 3, 2008 12:59 AM

May 1st 2008
Copyright The Economist

第一段的关键词:

frightening mood:令人可怕的情绪
xenophobic fists:排外的拳头(暗示义和团)
dangerous force:危险的力量
outburst of nationalism民族主义大爆发

评论:文章一开头,就将中国民众的爱国运动定性为令人可怕的,排外的民族主义的情绪爆发。而且是由政府煽动的。
然后就笔锋一转,称中国政府也应该为此担心。道出他们文章的核心:希望借中国政府之手平息对西方的抗议。
CHINA is in a frightening mood. The sight of thousands of Chinese
people waving xenophobic fists suggests that a country on its way to
becoming a superpower may turn out to be a more dangerous force than
optimists had hoped. But it isn’t just foreigners who should be
worried by these scenes: the Chinese government, which has encouraged
this outburst of nationalism, should also be afraid.

第二段的关键词

monopolistic hold:一党控制
grim austerity of their parents’childhoods:他们父母童年残忍的艰苦生活

评论:这段是回顾中国过去30年的变化。在肯定经济快速发展繁荣的同时,仍不失时机地攻击中国目前的政治体制和30年前的“苦难”。

For three decades, having shed communism in all but the name of its
ruling party, China’s government has justified its monopolistic hold
on power through economic advance. Many Chinese enjoy a prosperity
undreamt of by their forefathers. For them, though, it is no longer
enough to be reminded of the grim austerity of their parents’
childhoods. They need new aspirations.

第三段的关键词
the appeal to nationalism:求助民族主义
double-edged sword:双刃剑

评论:继续文章主旨:中国政府求助于民族主义来排解人民对国内问题的不满。而这个民族主义是个双韧剑。

The government’s solution is to promise them that China will be
restored to its rightful place at the centre of world affairs. Hence
the pride at winning the Olympics, and the fury at the embarrassing
protests during the torch relay. But the appeal to nationalism is a
double-edged sword: while it provides a useful outlet for domestic
discontents (see article), it could easily turn on the government
itself.


这一段的关键词:
mutinies:叛变,兵变,反抗(这个词用的相当阴险,并声称中国有上百万的叛乱)
alleged Chinese crimes:中国的罪行(为了做小小修饰,前面加了alleged一词,但这个罪行一词相当无耻。按照所谓西方法律,只要法院判决定了罪的行为才可以被认做是罪行。中国的行为被谁判了罪?在哪个法庭上被判了罪?谁给中国定了罪?alleged,是谁alleged 这就是典型的媒体欲加之罪,何唤无词的例子)
cosy relations with repellent regimes:和令人反感的政权保持亲密无间的关系(cosy这词相当狡猾,可以让读者发挥大量的想象。repellent 也是一个相当主观感性色彩的词,被谁反感?对被占领的伊拉克人民来说,美国也是一个岂知是令人反感,简直是令人憎恨的。另一个词是regimes。对他们不喜欢的国家政府,他们随意称呼他们为政权,来诋毁那个政府的合法性。

评论:只字不提西方政府将奥运政治化的阴谋,不提西方媒体对中国造谣中伤颠倒黑白。没有西方的恶意行径在先,哪里来的中国人民的强烈反弹?

A million mutinies

The torch relay has galvanised protests about all manner of alleged
Chinese crimes: in Tibet, in China’s broader human-rights record, in
its cosy relations with repellent regimes. And these in turn have
drawn counter-protests from thousands of expatriate Chinese, from
Chinese within the country and on the internet.

这一段的关键词:
the alleged “anti-China” bias:所谓的“反华”偏见。(这里又用了一个alleged,而且反华还用了引号。典型的此地无银三百两,邻居王二不曾偷。反华都这么公开了,还加什么引号啊?另外那个alleged,也表明文章根本不认同有这个偏见。西方让中国人民中国网民抓了个现行,人赃俱获,还用alleged,这本身就是狡赖。)
[Western press..] is accused:被控告(这也是一个狡猾的词,也就是说西方媒体遭污告。)
denounce the entire edifice of Western liberal democracy as a sham:把西方整个自由民主大厦谴责为赝品。

评论:上面的陈述是一个将中国对西方媒体的批判蓄意扩大化的立论。不知从何处得出结论中国人民对西方媒体罔顾事实捏造新闻妖魔化中国的谴责是对西方整个自由民主制度的否定。文中引用里几个中国人民对西方的批判,如在环境保护方面的双重标准,在美国总统选举中惯常的“攻击中国”的手段。但这些都是就事论事的批评,而不是什么对所谓“对西方自由民主整个大厦”的否定。这里边的伎俩是:用没有事实依据的扩大化立论“否定西方整个自由民主制度”,把中国的批评者置于西方自由民主制度对立面的地位,从而否定他们对西方很多有事实根据而且合情合理的批评。

Chinese rage has focused on the alleged “anti-China” bias of the
Western press, which is accused of ignoring violence by Tibetans in
the unrest in March. From this starting-point China’s defenders have
gone on to denounce the entire edifice of Western liberal democracy as
a sham. Using its tenets to criticise China is, they claim, sheer
hypocrisy. They cite further evidence of double standards: having
exported its dirtiest industries to China, the West wants the country
to curb its carbon emissions, potentially impeding its growth and
depriving newly well-off Chinese of their right to a motor car. And as
the presidential election campaign in America progresses, more
China-bashing can be expected, with protectionism disguised as noble
fury at “coddling dictators”.

这一段的关键词:
Rage:愤怒
out of all proportion to the alleged offences:对alleged 冒犯极度的反应过分(又是一个alleged,也就是说西方的冒犯都只是据说的)
fear:害怕
resentful, threatened West:忿恨的、被威胁的西方

China’s rage is out of all proportion to the alleged offences. It
reflects a fear that a resentful, threatened West is determined to
thwart China’s rise. The Olympics have become a symbol of China’s
right to the respect it is due. Protests, criticism and boycott
threats are seen as part of a broader refusal to accept and
accommodate China.

评论:同样,再次回避和否认西方率先挑起奥运政治化和新闻偏见道的事实,将中国的抗议归结为极度过分的此段介绍了中国的愤怒,

这一段的关键词:
an illusion:幻觉,假象
a land of a million mutinies:一片有无数(百万)反叛(叛乱、兵变)的土地
their land has been swallowed up for building by greedy local officials:
他们(农民)的土地被贪婪的官员侵吞搞建筑
People everywhere are aghast at the poisoning of China’s air:
每一处的人民都被中国有毒的空气所惊呆
Hardworking, honest citizens chafe at corrupt officials who treat them with contempt and get rich quick:
勤劳正直的公民对轻视他们的腐败和揾快钱官员而愤怒
the party still makes an ass of the law and a mockery of justice
党仍然愚弄法律和嘲笑公正

评论:这段已经完全是攻其一点、不及其余的肆意的谣言惑众了。每一处的人民?有什么数据可以证明?中国的空气都是有毒的?的证据又在哪里?中国公民的“惊呆”和“愤怒”,中国有13亿人,见过几个,就可以如此的武断地形容到所有中国人民?简直是太狂妄了吧?最后一句已经是对中国执政部门的恶意攻击了。感觉不是中国人民有幻觉,而是自己有幻觉。


There is no doubt genuine fury in China at these offences; yet the
impression the response gives of a people united behind the government
is an illusion. China, like India, is a land of a million mutinies
now. Legions of farmers are angry that their land has been swallowed
up for building by greedy local officials. People everywhere are
aghast at the poisoning of China’s air, rivers and lakes in the race
for growth. Hardworking, honest citizens chafe at corrupt officials
who treat them with contempt and get rich quick. And the party still
makes an ass of the law and a mockery of justice.

这一段的关键词:
danger for the government:对政府的危险(又在威胁中国政府了)
Popular anger, once roused, can easily switch targets:群众的愤怒,一旦被激起,可以很容易地转换目标
turn against a government accused of not doing enough to safeguard it:转向反对被认为没有很好维护民族尊严的政府(对政府晓以厉害)

评论:这段是想提醒爱国主义情绪起来以后对政府的危害。这就与前一段很矛盾了。既然中国政府那么不堪,怎么还要为这个政府着想啊?民意是一切民主制度的基石,西方不是一直支持民意的吗,为什么到了中国爱国主义这里,西方反而要求他们一直攻击的中国政府施以控制呢?
.

Herein lies the danger for the government. Popular anger, once roused,
can easily switch targets. This weekend China will be commemorating an
event seen as pivotal in its long revolution—the protests on May 4th
1919 against the humiliation of China by the Versailles treaty (which
bequeathed German “concessions” in China to Japan). The Communist
Party had roots in that movement. Now, as then, protests at perceived
slights against China’s dignity could turn against a government
accused of not doing enough to safeguard it.

这一段的关键词
Anger:气愤、愤怒
still far short of what would constitute democracy:距离民主制度尚远
pander to China’s pride:迎合中国的自豪感

Western leaders have a duty to raise concerns about human rights, Tibet and
other “sensitive” subjects:西方的领导人有义务提出对人权,西藏和其它“敏感”问题的关注

up to a point, pressure works:从某种程度上说,压力奏效了

This has happened because of, not despite, criticism from abroad:这就是因为国际批评而产生的结果.

评论:这一段是针对西方政客企业精英说的。就是要求他们要继续向中国政府施压,不要讨好中国,不要认为这种压力没有效果,其实他们的压力还是奏效的。最有意思的是,认为西方领导人有“义务”来关注中国的人权和少数民族问题。不知西方领导人的这个“义务”是谁赋予的?是依据哪条国际法准则被赋予的?如果西方领导人有这样的义务,那中国领导人是否也有“义务”关注西方国家的人权和少数民族问题?

Remember the ides of May

Western businessmen and policymakers are pulled in opposite directions
by Chinese anger. As the sponsors of the Olympics have learned to
their cost, while consumer- and shareholder-activists in the West
demand they take a stand against perceived Chinese abuses, in China
itself firms’ partners and customers are all too ready to take
offence. Western policymakers also face a difficult balancing act.
They need to recognise that China has come a long way very quickly,
and offers its citizens new opportunities and even new freedoms,
though these are still far short of what would constitute democracy.
Yet that does not mean they should pander to China’s pride. Western
leaders have a duty to raise concerns about human rights, Tibet and
other “sensitive” subjects. They do not need to resign themselves to
ineffectiveness: up to a point, pressure works: China has been
modestly helpful over Myanmar, North Korea and Sudan. It has even
agreed to reopen talks with the Dalai Lama’s representatives. This has
happened because of, not despite, criticism from abroad.

这一段的关键词:
hardliners:强硬派
ruling elite:统治精英
moderates:温和派
seems irreversible:看上去不可逆转
including reform of the architecture of the global institutions that reflect a 60-year-old
world order:包括改革反应了60年的世界秩序的全球结构
the world and China have to learn to live with each other:世界和中国必须学会共同生存

评论:这一段又比较阴险地将中国政府分为强硬派和温和派,并声称,即使西方施以更大压力,中国也不可能回到过去。并声称世界和中国应该学会共同生活在一起。这是一个很可笑的观点。中国作为一个有5000年历史的文明古国,一直和周围世界共同相处,从来不是个问题。怎么现在出了一个“世界”要学会和中国相处的问题了?其实,根本不是“世界”不会和中国相处,而是“西方”还没有学会如何和中国相处。

Pessimists fear that if China faces too much such pressure, hardliners
within the ruling elite will triumph over the “moderates” in charge
now. But even if they did, it is hard to see how they could end the
30-year-old process of opening up and turn China in on itself. This
unprecedented phenomenon, of the rapid integration into the world of
its most populous country, seems irreversible. There are things that
could be done to make it easier to manage—including reform of the
architecture of the global institutions that reflect a 60-year-old
world order. But the world and China have to learn to live with each
other.

这一段关键词
learning to respect foreigners’ rights to engage it even on its “internal affairs”:要学会尊重外国人的的权利,并将他们介入“国内事物”中
A more measured response to such criticism is necessary not only to China’s great-power ambitions, but also to its internal stability:对批评的更积极的回应不仅对中国的大国崛起的雄心是必要的,也有助它的内部稳定
distract Chinese people from their domestic discontents by breathing fire at foreigners:把怒火转向外国人可以转移中国百姓对国内事物的不满
run out of control:失去控制
frustrations:挫折、失望
tackling the pollution, the corruption and the human-rights abuses that contribute to the country’s dangerous mood:解决造成国内危险情绪的污染、贪腐、人权凌辱等问题
The Chinese people will demand it:中国人民要求这样做

评论:很阴险地向中国政府建议:如果中国想要学会和“世界”共处,就要承认外国人干涉中国内政的“权利”。不知道外国人的这些“权利”又是谁赋予的呢?中国人是否也有同样的权利来介入这些外国人的国家的内政呢?最可谓忽悠人的论点是,认为这样做不仅符合中国作为大国的雄心,也可以有助于国内的稳定。看一看今日的世界,凡是在国家主权问题上对西方指责作出积极回应的国家和政府,几乎没有一个获得了稳定,绝大部分都已经分裂了,最新近的例子就是前南斯拉夫。
另一个阴险的暗示,就是将中国人民对西方反华政客和媒体的抗议和愤怒解释为单单对“外国人”的愤怒,是因为受政府操纵,把对内的挫折和不满转化为对外的愤怒。这简直是对中国和海内外百万民众智慧和政治觉悟的歪曲和侮辱。
文章的最后,在对中国人民和中国政府进行了肆意的攻击和侮辱后,居然还以中国人民的名义代言:“中国人民要求这样做”。也太头脑发涨,不知自己是老几了。

For China, that means learning to respect foreigners’ rights to engage
it even on its “internal affairs”. A more measured response to such
criticism is necessary not only to China’s great-power ambitions, but
also to its internal stability; for while the government may distract
Chinese people from their domestic discontents by breathing fire at
foreigners, such anger, once roused, can run out of control. In the
end, China’s leaders will have to deal with those frustrations
head-on, by tackling the pollution, the corruption and the
human-rights abuses that contribute to the country’s dangerous mood.
The Chinese people will demand it.

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